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Online Dispute Resolution for Smart
Contracts
By Amy J. Schmitz * and Colin Rule *
Smart contracts built in the blockchain are quietly revolutionizing traditional transactions despite their questionable status under current law. At
the same time, disputes regarding smart contracts are inevitable, and parties will need means for dealing with smart contract issues. This Article
tackles this challenge, and proposes that parties turn to online dispute resolution (“ODR”) to efficiently and fairly resolve smart contract disputes.
Furthermore, the Article acknowledges the benefits and challenges of current blockchain ODR start-ups, and proposes specific ideas for how designers could address those challenges and incorporate ODR to provide
just resolutions that will not stymie efficiencies of smart contracts. Nonetheless, the Article also raises pivotal cautions and questions for ensuring
the fairness and transparency of these solutions over the longer term.

I. INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that technology is disrupting many industries, including law. 1 In
fact, technology is revolutionizing the art of deal-making by leaps and bounds.
Gone are the days when most deals were negotiated in person and sealed with a
handshake. 2 Instead, we now expect to make most purchases online through econtracts, sealed with a click on the “accept” button. 3 Even corporate leaders now
use e-mails and texts to negotiate deals, which they eventually “sign” online through
services like Docusign. 4
Despite our current comfort with these new types of online contracts, “smart
contracts” on the blockchain push the envelope even further into the digital age.
Smart contracts are different from traditional or common e-contracts in that they
are essentially computer code. 5 Those with no coding background cannot easily
interpret a smart contract in its rawest form. Instead, these contracts are spread
across blockchain nodes distributed throughout the world. 6 In other words, they are
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1. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR
FUTURE (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
2. AMY J. SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE
FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, at ix (2017).
3. Id.
4. Companies Using Verisign, IDATALABS (2017), https://idatalabs.com/tech/products/verisign.
5. David Zaslowsky, What to Expect When Litigating Smart Contract Disputes, Lᴀᴡ360 (Apr. 4,
2018, 5:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1028009/what-to-expect-when-litigating-smart-contract-disputes.
6. Id.
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made up of “nodes” which consist of computer coded algorithms that live in a decentralized ledger (blockchain). 7 Indeed, even attempting to summarize an explanation of smart contracts in an article Introduction seems foolish, and thus greater
explanation is provided in Part II of this article.
Although most do not fully understand smart contracts, hype about their use is
building. Futurists predict that smart contracts will create efficiencies and resolve
transactional trust issues. 8 Smart contracts may largely eliminate the need for complicated and costly letters of credit, bonds, and security agreements by digitizing
automatic enforcement, or payment. 9 For example, the Consensus 2018 conference
brought together thousands of industry leaders interested in blockchain, including
companies like FedEx, which are exploring blockchain as a logistics utility. 10 Furthermore, at the conference Microsoft announced the Azure Cloud Blockchain
Workbench, and automobile manufacturer Renault unveiled its plan to use blockchain for supply chain management. At the same time, Ripple announced the expansion of the XRP cryptocurrency via its new initiative X-Spring, and made a
splash with Snoop Dog performing at the XRP Community Night after party. 11
Despite this kind of hype around blockchain, however, these new approaches
raise new dilemmas. As Ethan Katsh, the Father of Online Dispute Resolution, has
put it: the power of technology to resolve disputes is exceeded by the power of
technology to generate disputes. 12 Inevitably, disagreements will arise regarding
the coding and content of smart contracts. 13 Trade disputes may arise within information placed in the blockchain, or smart contracts may be manipulated by fake
data, which will require quick and effective resolution to prevent major financial
loss. 14 For example, a 2016 study revealed that there are 100 errors per 1,000 lines
of coding. 15 Extrapolated to smart contracts, this means that many smart contracts
may not be accurately coded to encompass the parties’ original intentions. 16 Indeed,
coders may be sued for liability as a result of inaccurate smart contracts, or hackers
prosecuted for interfering with or manipulating smart contracts. 17
At the same time, there is no articulated and clear system of rules that apply to
smart contracts. 18 Civil law only recognizes contracts that are in written or documentary form, and common law contract rules dependent on choice of law do not

7. Jakub J. Szczerbowski, Place of Smart Contracts in Civil Law. A Few Comments on Form and
Interpretation, SSRN 333 (Jan. 8, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3095933.
8. Id. at 333, 337.
9. Id. at 335.
10. Nikhilesh De, FedEx Joins Hyperledger in Blockchain Consortium’s Latest Expansion, COINDESK
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/fedex-joins-hyperledger-in-blockchain-consortiums-latestexpansion/.
11. Nikhilesh De, Snoop Dogg to Perform at Ripple’s Blockchain Week NYC Party, COINDESK,
https://www.coindesk.com/snoop-dogg-to-perform-at-ripples-blockchain-week-party/ (last updated Ap
r. 25, 2018).
12. See ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE
INTERNET OF DISPUTES 1-25 (2017).
13. Pindar Wong, Making Trade Wars Obsolete, CONSENSUS 2018 at 40-46 (May 9, 2018), https://media.coindesk.com/uploads/events/2018/consensus/magazine/consensus-2018-magazine.pdf.
14. Id. at 41.
15. Zaslowsky, supra note 7.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Szczerbowski, supra note 9, at 335.
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fit the decentralized blockchain model. 19 It also may be difficult to fit square concepts of offer, acceptance and consideration into the round hole of smart contracts.
Additionally, if a matter falls under the statute of frauds, it is unclear whether a
coded transaction will constitute a “writing” and whether the keys to encrypt the
smart contracts will constitute signatures of the parties. 20
Nonetheless, even if one could get past civil and contract law principles in establishing agreement underlying smart contracts, that does not mean that classical
rules will provide remedies if problems develop. 21 What remedies exist for the
smart contract party who wants to prevent or reverse enforcement? If this were a
traditional contract, a party could rescind it in court, but smart contracts on the
blockchain present a different set of challenges. Enforcement is automatic, and the
code is immutable. Again, these are not really “contracts” in the true sense of the
word, understood by most as negotiated terms in an arms-length transaction (or
“meeting of the minds”). Thus, users may have different expectations, which means
disputes will be inevitable.
That again raises the question: Where will parties turn to resolve their smart
contract disputes? Litigation seems nonsensical since it is unclear whether or how
contract law should apply, what laws govern the transaction, and what evidence
could be collected to adjudicate the matter. Plus, offline litigation undermines the
efficiency and scalability of smart contracts. Furthermore, the anonymous nature
of smart contracts and the fluidity of online identities make it difficult to determine
who the parties actually are. Meanwhile, the decentralized nature of smart contracts
prevents courts from exercising jurisdiction or determining choice of law. 22 At the
same time, it is difficult to conceptualize how judges could fashion remedies that
consist of developing new code to update a smart contract deployed on a blockchain. 23
The dilemma of dealing with smart contract disputes therefore remains. Courts
and traditional processes simply do not work for resolving smart contract disputes,
making it imperative to invent the future. Bill Gates famously said, “Let’s go invent
tomorrow instead of worrying about what happened yesterday.” 24 This Article
therefore envisions a solution for smart contract dispute resolution, and proposes
online dispute resolution (“ODR”) built into smart contracts to efficiently and fairly
resolve disputes that arise along the way. The Article also raises cautions that developers and policymakers must consider as they build these ODR solutions.
This Article proceeds from description to prescription in light of the confusion
surrounding smart contracts. Accordingly, Part II of the Article will take a step
back and provide greater explanation and background on the evolution of smart
contracts, and their rise amidst the growth of cryptocurrencies. Part III further tackles questions regarding the complexities of smart contracts and their status under
current law. Part IV then expands the conversation to consider new means for dealing with smart contract issues. This will include discussion of current innovations,
as well as new prescriptions for incorporating ODR in the blockchain to provide
19. Id. at 336.
20. Zaslowsky, supra note 7.
21. Szczerbowski, supra note 9, at 335.
22. Id.
23. Zaslowsky, supra note 7.
24. Inspirational Quotes, INSPIRATIONAL QUOTES.GALLERY, http://inspirationalquotes.gallery/letsgo-invent-tomorrow-instead-of-worrying-about-what-happened-yesterday/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
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fast and fair resolution. Part V will add cautions for policymakers and businesses
to consider as they build these ODR solutions, and will envision next steps for robust smart contract solutions. Part VI will summarize conclusions.

II. THE RISE OF SMART CONTRACTS
A. Contracts vs. Smart Contracts
Smart contracts are confusing. Many, if not most, people have heard the term,
but are unclear what it means or why smart contracts are revolutionary. Accordingly, the first challenge is to explain how smart contracts work, what benefits they
provide, and why they may offer a better option for efficient and secure transactions
in particular contexts.
Nearly everyone knows what a traditional legal contract entails. Whether we
buy “101 Business Contracts” off the shelf at Office Depot or pay a white-shoe law
firm thousands of dollars to negotiate a contract, we generally understand “deals,”
aka contracts. Most see a contract as a document that details an agreement that
parties execute with the expectation that it is legally binding. Whether it is an agreement to open a bank account, buy stock, or work at a restaurant, most view the
structure and cadence of contracts to include offer, acceptance, and consideration,
with signature and date at the bottom.
This model of making and enforcing agreements is closely tied to the judicial
system. Judicial enforcement is the endgame. Accordingly, if a party violates the
terms, she can go to court and insist that the other party perform or pay damages for
breach. Furthermore, if parties disagree about the interpretation of the contract
terms, the court has power to decipher the parties’ arguments and make final determinations regarding the parties’ obligations. It is a highly manual process, often
involving expensive lawyers and slow-moving courts.
The traditional contract model is nonetheless changing in the digital age. As
noted above, many consumers agree to contracts each day by clicking a button and
“accepting” terms they never read, while purchasing goods and services on the internet. 25 As one study of end user license agreements from 2003–2010 showed,
online contracts have become an accepted norm. Furthermore, they have become
longer and increasingly less favorable to consumers. 26 Nonetheless, courts have
generally enforced these “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” contracts in the name of
efficiency. 27 In a sense, it is considered consumers’ own fault if they end up bound
to unfavorable contracts they failed to read.
In contrast to traditional paper and e-contracts, smart contracts bypass and ignore the legal model. Judicial enforcement is not their endgame. Instead of paying
lawyers to write paper documents filled with complex legalese, parties use technology to draft agreements in code so that there is no ambiguity around the parties’
obligations. These agreements involve no paper-shuffling or ink signatures at the
bottom. Instead, smart contracts are computer programs filled with “if/then”
clauses laying out each obligation and eventuality. These computer programs, once
created and formally accepted by both parties, can be self-enforcing, running in the
25. Zaslowsky, supra note7.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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cloud. Continuous monitoring of key performance metrics determines when one of
the “if/then” clauses suddenly switches from false to true, triggering automatic enforcement.
Through auto-enforcement, smart contracts can add efficiencies for many kinds
of agreements. This includes rental, intellectual property, financing, shipping, and
manufacturing contracts. Parties need not worry about facing the inefficiencies of
litigation or fighting for payment when the terms and enforcement are already predetermined and established in the computer coding per “if/then” rules. If event “x”
happens (e.g. a website is launched), then “y” occurs (e.g. payment is made). Having this built into unchangeable computer code, with assured payment upon performance, addresses trust issues that often stymie traditional deals based on a handshake. 28 Again, this means that smart contracts largely eliminate the need for the
complicated and costly means for securing payment such as letters of credit, bonds,
and security agreements.

B. The Role of the Blockchain in Smart Contracts
One of the key technologies behind smart contracts is the blockchain. A blockchain is a distributed ledger (like a distributed database) spread across the internet.
It allows for information to be entered into the system and stored in different, redundant locations located throughout the world. When a document is put into the
blockchain, it is replicated across every archival node, so even if half of the nodes
go down for some reason, the data is still available. Imagine if you had a notepad
where everything you wrote in the notepad would be duplicated exactly in other
notepads around the world (and everything written in those notepads would appear
in your notepad as well). Even if your notepad was destroyed, the other notepads
around the world would have everything you wrote in it, so the contents would
never be lost.
Also, imagine if there were global rules that governed what could be written in
the notepads. If someone tried to write something in a notepad that didn’t follow
the rules, then all the other notepads would reject it. This is another feature of the
blockchain: if someone provides an update that doesn’t follow the network rules,
then the other nodes will evaluate the contribution and determine the update doesn’t
comply, so they will not add it to the definitive ledger. That makes spoofing or
editing information previously submitted into the blockchain extremely difficult, if
not impossible. Moreover, the complexity of coordinating changes across all nodes
in the blockchain is so significant that any would-be hackers would have an almost
insurmountable challenge in front of them.
This makes smart contracts built into the blockchain incredibly powerful. As
noted above, smart contracts are already self-enforcing computer programs, but
they become more secure when programmers drop them into the blockchain. Smart
contracts eliminate the need for paper documents, wet ink signatures, and for the
most part—courts. This new system, built on smart contracts and blockchain, enforces agreements through code instead of judges and jails. Jurisdiction and legal

28. Szczerbowski, supra note 9, at 333.
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rules become largely irrelevant because the system itself establishes the basis for
enforcement. 29
In this new structure, a computer network manages all contracts across jurisdictions. That means that contract information is not housed in one central location,
vulnerable to outages and hackers. This can enhance trust and enforceability, while
reinforcing privacy and security. The blockchain provides encryption with public
and private keys, which are blockchain–based identification numbers provided by
the network. 30
That said, it is important to note that blockchain is not impenetrable. It is more
secure than general cloud-based systems, but it can be “hacked” and has its own
risks. 31 Proponents of the blockchain claim that the distributed ledger is “immutable,” “secure,” and “trustless.” 32 However, hackers could manipulate the technology by, for example, using a “hard fork” to essentially create a copy of the blockchain which might allow unscrupulous parties to manipulate the data and essentially
“steal” information. Indeed, a well-executed “hard fork” could even make a blockchain vulnerable to corruption and collapse. 33
At the same time, blockchain is evolving in ways that make it less susceptible
to attacks, and thus more reliable and trustworthy. It is moving far beyond its origins in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. The central objective of the blockchain was
to create a self-regulating network that would enable the transfer of property between peers without the oversight of a third party, namely the courts and regulators. 34 However, the original Bitcoin system has been improved in newer platforms
like Ethereum, which built on the initial Bitcoin architecture to allow for faster execution and more flexible integration. This moved the ball forward, but opening
the door wider also enabled less experienced coders to leverage tools to design their
own smart contracts, perhaps raising the risk of programming bugs and coding errors. 35
These risks have not slowed the blockchain boom. 36 In 2017, venture capitalists invested $1 billion in start-up blockchain companies. 37 At the same time, blockchain companies offered $5 billion in initial coin offerings (“ICOs”), which are now
recognized by the Securities and Exchange Commission and regulated as securities. 38 Other noteworthy initiatives include the “Dubai Blockchain Strategy,” which
is a multi-pronged initiative by the Dubai Future Foundation and the Smart Dubai
Office, to make Dubai the first city run essentially on the blockchain by the year

29. Marco Dell’Erba, Demystifying Technology. Do Smart Contracts Require a New Legal Framework? Regulatory Fragmentation, Self-Regulation, Public Regulation 27-28 (Aug. 20, 2018), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3228445.
30. Id. at 9.
31. Angela Walch, Blockchain’s Treacherous Vocabulary: One More Challenge for Regulators, 21 J.
INTERNET L. 1, 5-7 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3019328.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 2-7. Instead of claiming the technology is “tamper-proof,” some proponents now call it “tam
per-resistant.” Id.
34. See generally Walch, supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. Brant Carson et al., Blockchain Beyond the Hype: What is the Strategic Business Value?,
MCKINSEY DIGITAL (June 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/ourinsights/blockchain-beyond-the-hype-what-is-the-strategic-business-value.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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2020. 39 Dubai therefore plans to move all essential records to the blockchain, including health records, title transfers, identification verification data, wills, and data
related to financing and exchanging goods. 40
Dubai is not alone in exploring blockchain to increase operational efficiency
and reduce costs by eliminating intermediaries. 41 For example, law firms are building blockchain departments. 42 Their business clients have been experimenting with
blockchain through venues like the Accord Project consortium. 43 Meanwhile, major tech companies like IBM and standard setting groups like the IEEE have been
working to set common data and performance standards for smart contracts, which
are crucial for wide acceptance. 44 In fact, ninety percent of Australian, European
and North American banks are “experimenting” with using blockchain to verify and
transfer financial “information and assets.” 45 Additionally, twenty-five governments are piloting blockchain platforms. 46
Nonetheless, blockchain is still in its infancy, and will need to gain credibility
and acceptance before it will truly scale. 47 It will take some time for competitors to
cooperate on issues regarding the system, the data, and the investments necessary
to ensure system operation. 48 However, blockchain technologies are becoming
more robust and accessible, which is part of what is pushing smart contracts into
wider use.

C. The Emerging New Normal
Over the past year, smart contracts have leaped into the mainstream. RocketLawyer announced a partnership with smart contract pioneer OpenLaw and blockchain developer ConsenSys to bring blockchain-based products to the online consumer space. This includes a “Rocket Wallet” that links RocketLawyer contracts
to the Ethereum blockchain. 49 Soon after, RocketLawyer’s main competitor, LegalZoom, announced a partnership with the company Clause to provide blockchainbased smart contracts to their customers as well. 50 The move toward smart contracts
39. Saqr Ereiqat, Blockchain in Dubai: Smart Cities from Concept to Reality, IBM (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/04/blockchain-in-dubai-smart-cities-from-concept-to-reality/.
40. Id. See also Samburaj Das, Opening Shop? Dubai Government Launches Blockchain Business
Registry, CCN (May 5, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/dubai-government-launches-blockchain-businessregistry/. This gave rise to Global Blockchain Council, bringing together a consortium of government
entities, UAE banks, blockchain technology firms and major companies, like IBM and Consensys.
41. Carson et al., supra note 38.
42. Roger Aitken, Accord Project’s Consortium Launching First Legal ‘Smart Contracts’ with Hyperledger, FORBES (July 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2017/07/26/accord-projects-consortium-launching-first-legal-smart-contracts-with-hyperledger/#34781496472c.
43. Id.
44. IBM Joins Accord Project Smart Contract Consortium, ARTIFICIAL LAW. (June 28, 2018), https:/
/www.artificiallawyer.com/2018/06/28/ibm-joins-accord-project-smart-contract-consortium.
45. Carson et al., supra note 38.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. What the Rocket Lawyer/OpenLaw Smart Contract Deal Means, ARTIFICIAL LAW. (Sept. 7, 2018),
https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2018/09/07/what-the-rocket-lawyer-openlaw-smart-contract-dealmeans/.
50. LegalZoom Offers Smart Contracts with Pioneer Clause, ARTIFICIAL LAW. (Sept. 17, 2018), http
s://www.artificiallawyer.com/2018/09/17/legalzoom-offers-smart-contracts-with-pioneer-clause/.
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is significant when the two largest online legal services companies in the United
States take such steps forward in the mainstreaming of blockchain and smart contracts in everyday legal services.
These recent moves are also important in that they indicate how smart contracts
integrate with standard currencies. In other words, these moves open doors to smart
contracts for those who have not embraced cryptocurrencies. 51 As noted above,
blockchain-based smart contracts initially evolved out of virtual currencies like
Bitcoin and Ethereum. Accordingly, one had to own these cryptocurrencies in order
to participate in smart contracts. However, ventures like OpenLaw, noted above,
allow individuals and small businesses to make use of blockchain-based smart contracts without the use of any cryptocurrency. They are free to use United States
dollars or British pounds (referred to as “fiat currencies” in the blockchain world).
These tools therefore allow almost anyone to use a smart contract, even if they know
nothing about blockchain and hold no cryptocurrency. 52
In sum, big and small businesses alike are trying to make smart contracts the
new normal. Integrating blockchain-based agreements into everyday legal tasks is
a big step in that direction. Individuals can leverage these technologies to establish
trusted payments without need for traditional secured transactions. Individuals may
use smart contracts for day to day legal issues like employment contracts, rental
agreements, and wills. Once these approaches cross the tipping point, they will
become commonplace in every sector of the economy.

III. COMPLEXITIES AND CONFLICTS AROUND SMART CONTRACTS
A. Unclear Legal Status
Despite the hype around blockchain’s potential, smart contracts raise many unanswered questions. Unforeseen disputes will almost certainly arise regarding contract coding and execution. As noted above, there is even a risk that fake data will
improperly trigger, or fail to trigger, smart contract clauses. This may result in
major financial losses. 53 Computer programmers, or coders, also may face liability
for erroneous coding. 54 Coders working in concert with smart contract drafters
could face damages for creating improperly structured contracts, while hackers may
attempt to manipulate data to the advantage of one or the other party. 55
At the same time, there is no articulated and clear system of rules that apply to
smart contracts. 56 At the core of “contract law” is the concept of consent. This idea
of consent requires some effective communication of an intentional transfer of
rights and obligations between parties. 57 Presumably the parties to a smart contract,
like any contract, will have consented to the terms underlying the code. 58 However,
51. What the Rocket Lawyer/OpenLaw Smart Contract Deal Means, supra note 51.
52. Id. See also Bringing Real World Value Onto the Blockchain with OpenLaw and ChainLink,
BITCOINS CHANNEL (Aug. 19, 2018), https://bitcoinschannel.com/bringing-real-world-value-onto-theblockchain-with-openlaw-and-chainlink.
53. Wong, supra note 15.
54. Zaslowsky, supra note 7.
55. Id.
56. Szczerbowski, supra note 9, at 335.
57. Meg Leta Jones & Elizabeth Edenberg, The Legal Roots and Moral Core of Digital Consent,
SSRN (Feb. 27, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3131392.
58. See Szczerbowski, supra note 9.
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as noted earlier, smart contracts are translated into code without the same pageantry
of traditional contracts. 59 This means that it may be difficult for the parties to understand whether the code accurately memorializes their agreement. In this way,
smart contracts lack the usual cautionary, evidentiary, and channeling functions of
written contracts in the traditional system. 60
By their nature, smart contracts codify agreement outside of the legal system. 61
Smart contracts may therefore allow parties to circumvent legal rules. 62 This is why
lawyers debate whether smart contracts are “contracts” in the legal sense. 63 In common law, it is unclear that code constitutes true offer, acceptance and consideration.
Civil lawyers then argue whether there is sufficient documentary evidence to support legal enforcement. 64 Moreover, as of the time of the Article, no United States
court has reviewed blockchain or smart contracts. 65 No precedent has been set.
Additionally, as noted above, even if one gets past contract formation questions
by looking back to the originating documents, jurisdiction and other legal questions
create hurdles for litigating smart contracts. 66 Smart contracts on a blockchain are
generally anonymous, and become even more anonymous when they use cryptocurrencies that make it nearly impossible to discover identities of the parties or their
computers. 67 Without knowing the identity and domicile of the parties, courts are
unable to establish jurisdiction using traditional rules based on minimum contacts
or physical presence. 68
Furthermore, even if a court could determine jurisdiction of the parties, it would
be difficult for a court to interpret a smart contract, because the code is written to
be understood by programmers, not lawyers and judges. 69 At the same time, it
would be difficult for a court to intervene to prevent or reverse automatic contract
executions. 70 Furthermore, it is difficult to see how courts will be able to fill gaps
in smart contracts, especially given that blockchain does not generally allow for
modifications. 71
That said, some argue that governance standards around the blockchain will
emerge to promote “confidence in the technology and the legal and regulatory environment.” 72 They see government or other standards groups dictating rules that
will govern smart contracts. In the United States, states are beginning to introduce

59. Mark Verstraete, The Stakes of Smart Contracts, SSRN (May 17, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3178393.
60. Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 103 (2000); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-01.
61. Verstraete, supra note 61.
62. Id.
63. Szczerbowski, supra note 9, at 33-35.
64. Id. at 33-40.
65. Id.
66. Wulf A. Kaal & Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution, 73 BUS. LAW. 1, 37-38
(2018).
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at 36.
69. Id. at 39.
70. Id. at 40.
71. Usha Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, SSRN 5 (May 6, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3127
782.
72. JOSEPH J. BAMBARA & PAUL R. ALLEN, BLOCKCHAIN: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DEVELOPING
BUSINESS, LAW, AND TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 84-95 (2018).

112

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2019

and pass legislation regarding enforcement of smart contracts. 73 Some commentators also have proposed that legal rules could be coded into the blockchain contracts
themselves. 74
The problem with these ideas for governmental regulation, however, is that
blockchain technology is advancing at breakneck speed. Meanwhile, traditional
legal systems are notoriously reactive and slow to act. 75 Furthermore, regulations
would have to be international and widely accepted because blockchain contracts
are cross–jurisdictional and international, among parties of varying nationalities. 76
Accordingly, smart contracts need their own dispute resolution systems. 77 Interest in smart contracts will continue to grow, meaning more and more smart contracts will be created, and as is true with any form of contract (smart or otherwise)
some disputes are inevitable. Coding for possible breaches of contract can only go
so far because there will always be a lack of foresight and information, as well as
unpredictable human behavior. 78 There also will be technical problems and mistakes in the coding. 79 Furthermore, traditional litigation fails to address smart contracts’ need for remedies that preserve anonymity and fit within the blockchain. 80
Courts and traditional processes simply will not work for resolving smart contract
disputes.

B. Automation Concerns
As our lives have moved online, artificial intelligence (“AI”) and automation
have infiltrated everything from the movies we watch to the contracts we conclude. 81 AI-powered marketing tracks what we watch on services like Netflix, and
delivers suggestions for future viewing. 82 AI thus recognizes patterns of behavior,
generates new knowledge from these patterns, and makes predictions, often using
algorithms. 83 Among other things, AI has been applied to power self-driving cars
and targeted consumer advertising. 84
However, automation has a different meaning in smart contracts. As Nick
Szabo has explained, a smart contract is “a set of promises specified in digital form”
carried out automatically by an algorithm. 85 Smart contracts do not operate on mere
predictions. Instead, once a smart contract is created and put on the blockchain,

73. Zaslowsky, supra note 7, at 2.
74. Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 68, at 44.
75. Id. at 45.
76. Id. at 45-46.
77. Id. at 46.
78. Id. at 46-47.
79. Id. at 47.
80. Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 68, at 47.
81. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Second Digital Disruption: Streaming & the
Dawn of Data-Driven Creativity, SSRN 6-16 (Aug. 8, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3226566.
82. Id. at 29.
83. Id. at 1-2.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Dell’Erba, supra note 31, at 2-12.
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execution is automated and irrevocable, or at least prohibitively expensive to revoke. 86 As such, smart contracts essentially eliminate “do-overs.” They are selfgoverning and self-executing. 87
One scholar has compared smart contracts to vending machines: the product is
delivered once money is received with no ability for human intervention. 88 In other
words, the terms are “embedded” in the machine, and it performs (delivers a product) in response to receiving the requisite amount of money. 89 The machine cannot
refuse to perform, and its structure (thick glass face) protects the product from theft
or fraud. 90 This means that one cannot make post hoc changes to her selections. If
one chooses chips, she is stuck with chips. This is very efficient because the selfexecution eliminates transaction costs. However, the consumer may grow angry
when the chips get stuck and they don’t fall all the way down to the doorway where
they can be retrieved.
Smart contracts are similarly self–executing. As noted above, this automation
makes smart contracts very attractive in terms of efficiency and diminished enforcement costs. Cryptoeconomists, or proponents of smart contracts, therefore argue
that smart contracts beneficially replace contract law, based on the belief that circumventing the legal system is desirable. 91 They claim that smart contracts increase
efficiency, lower transaction costs, and largely eliminate the need for lawyers or
courts. 92
However, scholars such as Verstraete argue that smart contracts are “normatively illegitimate.” 93 Their principle criticism of smart contracts is that they are
founded on “classical legal thought” that aims to eliminate state involvement in
private law. 94 Cryptoeconomists, like classical legal thinkers, essentially applaud
smart contracts’ circumvention of government control. 95 In contrast, Legal Realists
argue that the state has a necessary role in regulating the fairness of the private
marketplace, including contracts. 96 They worry that powerful parties and unscrupulous dealers will hijack smart contracting, and their automatic and extra-legal
nature will leave victims with no recourse. 97
An example of automatic enforcement gone awry is the 2016 DAO (or decentralized autonomous organization) debacle. Blockchain enthusiasts created the
2016 DAO using blockchain and a web of smart contracts as the foundation for
what was to be a tamper-proof extra-legal company on the blockchain. 98 The 2016
DAO was a literal autonomous organization that would continue without the need

86. Id. at 14.
87. Id.
88. Verstraete, supra note 61, at 13.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Three justifications underlie this belief: 1) smart contracts can be a tool favoring consumers to
overcome doctrines that now give an advantage to firms; 2) the transaction costs of forming and enforcing smart contracts is lower than traditional contracts; and 3) smart contracts allow individuals to set the
terms of their agreement without state interference. Id. at 5-20.
92. Id. at 7-8.
93. Verstraete, supra note 61, at 3.
94. Id. at 19.
95. Id. at 23.
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id.
98. Rodrigues, supra note 73, at 12.
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for code changes once it began its operations. 99 A flaw in the DAO design, however, allowed an individual to withdraw $50 million from the DAO without any real
“breach” or fraud. Moreover, the DAO’s self-enforcing code and lack of applicable
legal rules eliminated means for reversal or traditional remedies. 100 The only recourse was to completely terminate the DAO and admit defeat. 101
Some also raise the “oracle problem” as a hindrance for fair smart contracting.
This refers to the lack of a reliable and secure delivery mechanism that exchanges
real time information with blockchain data systems. 102 Currently, there is no
clearly secure delivery of information among systems. 103 For example, most existing oracles are run on centralized or single source services which have the same
security issues as most traditional data systems that can be “hacked” centrally. 104
Nonetheless, some companies are working to address this issue. For example,
ChainLink is working on fixing this problem by combining its software with a hardware system called Town Crier. ChainLink is a group that connects smart contracts
with off-chain resources by selling usage of data feeds, APIs, and other payment
capabilities to smart contracts on a decentralized network. 105 Town Crier uses a
process that cannot make system calls but can take in data from outside a protected
address, to protect the data connection from outside attacks and keep the information confidential using cryptography. 106 Accordingly, this is just one example
of how smart contracts problems are being addressed with technology.
Despite these advances, smart contracts remain in a cloud of legal and technological uncertainty. Although smart contracts provide efficiencies and cost-savings,
they create risks related to automation and limited remedies. The questions therefore focus on likely remedies and means for smart contract dispute resolution.

IV. BRINGING ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION INTO SMART CONTRACTS
Developers and entrepreneurs are moving quickly to create solutions for resolving smart contract disputes. They realize that these disputes demand non-judicial remedy systems that are cross-jurisdictional, extra-legal, and efficient. Accordingly, start-up companies are creating online dispute resolution (“ODR”) systems
in the blockchain. The primary ODR models to date have been online arbitration,
crowd-sourced dispute resolution, and AI-powered resolutions. Developments in
each of those areas are discussed below.

99. Id. at 29.
100. Id. at 33.
101. Id. at 36. Of course, the DAO could be resurrected with new coding using a corporate structure to
shield liability, but the fact remains that coding is king in blockchain–but there must be means for resolving disputes along the way without dissolving the smart contract at the core.
102. Mike Orcutt, Blockchain Smart Contracts are Finally Good for Something in the Real World, MIT
TECH. REV. (Nov 19, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612443/blockchain-smart-contractscan-finally-have-a-real-world-impact/.
103. Id.
104. Steve Ellis, Ari Juels, & Sergey Nazarov, ChainLink: A Decentralized Oracle Network, CHAIN
LINK (Sept. 4, 2017), https://link.smartcontract.com/whitepaper.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id. at 6; Fan Zhang et al., Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts, CORNELL
U., https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/168.pdf (last visited Nov 29, 2018).
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A. Arbitration
Arbitration “took its rise in the very infancy of Society” as a private and selfcontained process, outside of the courts. 107 Communities created arbitration systems designed to quickly and efficiently determine disputes in accordance with local norms and accepted equitable principles. 108 These self-contained arbitration
systems served community needs for efficient, economical, equitable and private
proceedings. 109 By the early twentieth century, nearly every trade or profession
had developed its own machinery for arbitration. 110 Indeed, the New York Chamber
of Commerce arbitration panels were independent from the judiciary and continued
to resolve disputes between American and British merchants during and after the
American Revolution. 111 Given this history of resorting to extra-legal resolutions,
it is no surprise that developers have turned to online arbitration for resolving blockchain disputes.

107. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 25 (1918) (quoting JOHN
MONTGOMERIE BELL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION IN SCOTLAND 1 (2d ed. 1877)).
108. Id. at 22-27 (emphasizing special utility of arbitration despite the development of a reputable judicial system in mercantile cases in which arbitrator expertise in technical matters is essential). See also
James A.R. Nafziger, Arbitration of Rights and Obligations in the International Sports Arena, 35 VAL.
U. L. REV. 357 (2001) (demonstrating communal concepts of arbitrations based on equity, norms and
standards in modern international sports arbitrations); Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 144 (1934) (quoting MALYNES, LEX MERCATORIA 303
(1622)).
109. “Of all mankind’s adventure in search of peace and justice, arbitration is among the earliest. Long
before law was established, or courts were organized, or judges had formulated principles of law, men
had resorted to arbitration for the resolving of discord, the adjustment of differences, and the settlement
of disputes.” FRANCES A. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 3 (1948). See also Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37
YALE L. J. 595, 597 (1928); Margit Mantica, Arbitration in Ancient Egypt, 12 ARB. J. 155, 155-59 (1957)
(noting scarcity of records of early arbitrations because arbitrations generally involved purely private
disputes that had little public significance); WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION VOLUME 1:
OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 645-47, 795-97 (1954) (describing arbitration systems in early Chinese civilization that provided means for “a wholesome compromise” and means for the people to end “minor”
disputes in accordance with face-saving compromise).
110. Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the
Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 238, 247 (1930) (reporting that the following trade associations had
active arbitration facilities: Automotive Industry, Bottlers Association, Clothing and Dry Goods, Construction Industries, Cotton and By-Products, Financial Organizations, Food Industries, Fuel, Heat, Light
and Power, Fur, Grain, Hay and Seed, Hardware, Import and Export, Jewelers, Leather Hides and Skins,
Lumber and Allied Industries, Manufacturers, Medical, Motion Pictures, Music, Paint, Oil and Varnish,
Paper and Pulp, Printing and Engraving, Real Estate, Rubber, Silk, Theatre, Transportation, Warehousing, Wool. Professional communities with arbitration mechanisms included: Dental, Rotary, International, Legal Aid, Civil Engineers, American Institute of Accountants).
111. William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey,
1956 WASH. U. L. REV. 193, 207 (1956). Chamber arbitrations continued during the British occupation
in 1779, after the Chamber’s need for arbitration prompted a special meeting that produced a letter to
the British Commander requesting arbitrations to resolve mercantile disputes. Id. at 208. The Commander acquiesced in the request, and arbitration served as the only means for resolution of civil disputes
during the British occupation. Arbitration continued to thrive after the revolution in both England and
North America. Id. at 209-12.
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1. Sagewise
Sagewise is a Los Angeles-based start-up aiming to provide dispute resolution
infrastructure for smart contract disputes. 112 Notably, the Sagewise platform does
not itself provide arbitration or have ODR capability. Instead, Sagewise’s technology is integrated into a smart contract via a coded clause in which users pre-set
certain parameters, such as when and how long the smart contract execution should
be delayed and who will resolve any disputes that may arise. 113 Accordingly, this
clause allows a party to freeze contract execution and activate the Sagewise “Dispute Resolution Mode” if a dispute develops. 114 The party can then choose various
dispute resolution processes for solving smart contract problems and enforcing
online judgments. 115
In this way, Sagewise claims to be “dispute resolution agnostic.” 116 In other
words, although Sagewise appears to be leaning in the direction of incorporating
online arbitration as the final, and definitive, step for resolving disputes, it also allows parties to incorporate online mediation or other resolution processes into the
contracts. 117
The process begins with what Sagewise calls its “contract canary,” which is a
notification and monitoring system like Google Alerts, for smart contracts.
Through this system, execution of the smart contract is delayed for a short period
of time while parties are notified of imminent execution. If the smart contract appears to be executing in an unintended fashion, users can “freeze” execution of the
smart contract before it is too late, and take the time to resolve the issue. At that
point, parties may use negotiation and other means for seeking mutual resolution.
If that does not end the dispute, parties then move on to resolve their dispute with
their pre–appointed dispute resolution provider, who was selected from a marketplace of providers during initial smart contract set–up. Users may also return to the
marketplace to the extent the third-party provider is unable to resolve the dispute—
i.e., if the provider has a conflict of interest or is no longer in business. Providers
on the marketplace may range from resolution by an automated bot to a traditional
panel of arbitration judges. 118
Sagewise aims to distinguish itself by also being blockchain and distributed
ledger agnostic. Currently, the company intends to support Ethereum and Hedera

112. Smart Contract Checker, Sagewise, Links with Hedera Hashgraph, ARTIFICIAL LAW. (June 8,
2018), https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2018/06/08/smart-contract-checker-sagewise-links-with-hedera-hashgraph/ (noting that variability in coding means that self-executing contracts may veer from their
agreed-upon course either because they were flawed to begin with or were subverted during operation).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Sagewise Puts Focus on Blockchain Immutability and Dispute Resolution, THE DAILY HODL
(May 11, 2018), https://dailyhodl.com/2018/05/11/sagewise-puts-focus-on-blockchain-immutabilityand-dispute-resolution/.
117. Id. (noting that the company believes that humans are superior to robots in “sorting information,
parallel processing and analyzing context”).
118. Sagewise’s Vision to Build the Safety Net for Smart Contracts, SAGEWISE (May 8, 2018), https://
www.sagewise.io/tag/sdk. Sagewise also provides collection tools, and permits use of a crowd jury, although it is not crowdsourced per se. At the time of writing this article, Sagewise is still in early stages
of filing patents and getting investors.
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Hashgraph, and helps chair the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Working Group
for the EOS Alliance. 119

2. OpenBazaar Dispute Resolution
OpenBazaar is a market platform for the sale of goods and services using
bitcoin, and requiring online arbitration to ensure that exchanges between parties
are conducted with minimal risk. 120 It states that it uses an open marketplace for
arbitration to “facilitate a polycentric merchant law to accommodate the requirements and preferences of each individual.” 121 In particular, OpenBaazar allows users to decide at the start if they wish to have an anonymous third party, called a
notary, verify the contract, the funds, and find out if the parties believe that each
has fulfilled its obligations. 122 Users opting for the notary pay a fee and deposit
bitcoin into an escrow. 123 The notary will then verify transactions and release funds
as directed. 124
If either party is unsatisfied, the notary becomes an arbitrator, and determines
the dispute based on evidence presented. 125 These transactions on OpenBazaar are
not entirely self-executing, and extra layers of verification may impede the platform’s efficiency. 126 However, OpenBazaar claims to choose qualified professionals in order to produce quality outcomes. 127 It also boasts of transparency regarding
its arbitration market. It states: “These agents will list the duties they perform, the
estimated response-time for their services, and fees. In addition to these, arbitration
service providers can also display a list precedents that they themselves have established or other arbiters have published in order to give an expectation of service
process and quality.” [stet.] 128 Accordingly, OpenBazaar seems to set up a fairly
traditional arbitration mechanism.

B. Crowdsourcing
In contrast to simple online arbitration, crowdsourced dispute resolution uses
what could be seen as “mob justice” by allowing anonymous users to vote on “winners” on the blockchain. Crowdsourced dispute resolution is not new. For example,
more than twenty years ago iCourthouse pioneered the notion of online crowdsourcing in civil cases 129 and ten years ago eBay India’s Community Court leveraged the
best judgement of other eBay users to decide whether a contested eBay review
should be deleted. 130 The following examples of crowdsourced dispute resolution
119. EOS ALL., https://eosalliance.io/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2018).
120. Dispute Resolution in OpenBazaar, GITHUB GIST, https://gist.github.com/drwasho/405d51bd1b
1a32e38145 (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
121. Id.
122. Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 68, at 50-52.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 53-55.
127. Dispute Resolution in OpenBazaar, supra note 122.
128. Id.
129. ICOURTHOUSE (Mar. 6, 2019), http://www.icourthouse.com/main.taf.
130. Colin Rule & Chittu Nagarajan, Crowdsourcing Dispute Resolution Over Mobile Devices, in MO
BILE TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, GOVERNANCE,
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on the blockchain go even further with this model, however, by tokenizing the process. In other words, jurors vote with funds (generally cryptocurrency) which they
lose if they are on the losing side. In contrast, jurors on the winning side generally
gain some reward. This creates a market for accurate crowdsourced resolution outcomes. The nuances of each system differ, as do the approaches utilized to address
fraud and promote gamification.

1. Kleros
Kleros is a crowdsourced online arbitration “court” built on Ethereum for resolution of smart contract disputes. 131 Applications for Kleros include managing
disputes over escrow accounts and insurance payments, and resolving claims of
abuse on social networks. Kleros’s quest is to be “[a] fast, inexpensive, transparent,
reliable and decentralized” ODR system built on game theory, and discovering a
“Schelling point” for resolving disputes. 132 This builds on Thomas Schelling’s theory that in the absence of communication and trust, people will nonetheless choose
“Focal Points” to reach consensus. 133
Specifically, Kleros enlists random “jurors” from around the world based on
the number of “Pinakion” tokens (cryptocurrency) they deposit to show their availability and interest in resolving a given dispute. 134 Parties to a dispute present their
cases to the jurors, and jurors secretly make a “commitment” to vote for a particular
party—with the proviso that they cannot change or reveal their votes before the
voting is closed. 135 Jurors are penalized for communicating with each other, and
must “justify” their votes so that the parties can later understand their decisions. 136
After the vote is closed, the jurors reveal their votes and the resolution with the most
juror support wins. 137
Jurors benefit from “winning” resolutions by taking the tokens of jurors who
sided with the “losing” party. 138 Additionally, jurors are paid from the arbitration
fee the parties pay to use the Kleros court. 139 These fees rise as parties appeal jury
decisions. 140 However, it is unclear that fees are paid with the Pinakion tokens.
Instead, Kleros requires jurors to use Pinakion as “work tokens” designated for indicating interest in being selected for jury duty and voting, in order to discourage
PARTICIPATION 93, 93-100 (Marta Poblet ed., 2011). When a seller receives a bad review on eBay that
she doesn’t believe she deserves, she may submit a claim to the Community Court. At that point, she
and the buyer submit evidence, such as photos or explanatory text, through an online portal. Twentyone eBay jurors are randomly selected from a pool of applicants, who are eBay users that have met
eligibility requirements. These jurors all submit impartial votes, and whichever side gets more than half
of the votes will win the case.
131. Clement Lesaege & Federico Ast, Kleros 1 (Nov. 2018), https://kleros.io/assets/whitepaper.pdf.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2. According to Schelling, the focal points reflect each person’s expectation of what another
person expects him to do. In this game theoretic model, even people who do not trust one another will
decide to work together and be truthful because it is at this focal point that parties reach “win-win”
results.
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id. at 7.
136. Lesaege & Ast, supra note 133, at 7.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 8. Under its proposed governance, Kleros will create subcourts and update and adapt the
program as necessary.
139. Id. at 7.
140. Id. at 8.
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fraud. 141 Kleros theorizes that staking Pinakions to show interest will prevent attackers who would have to buy 51% of the staked tokens in order to “buy” the
jury. 142 Furthermore, as more jurors buy tokens, these tokens will become scarce
and more expensive, making it even more difficult to amass the power necessary to
take over the system. 143 In addition, Kleros can fork the system if necessary because
it controls the tokens. 144
Kleros also launched a study as a means for testing its system. 145 The study
asked voters to evaluate pictures featuring cats and/or dogs, and to vote “dog” or
“not dog.” 146 After tabulating the votes, the researchers found that 70% of the cases
resolved in favor of the plaintiff, and in the majority of those cases, by a unanimous
vote. 147 The study also looked at the effect of bribes on the voting outcomes, and
determined that if a case proceeded to appeal, the honest voter received a substantial
payout. 148 This disincentives bribery. In other words, one would have to buy and
stake a great deal of tokens in order to even “bet” on overtaking the honest voters. 149
Regardless, these jurors need not have any substantive knowledge related to the
cases. They simply need to stake tokens to show interest.

2. Aragon
Aragon Network also uses crowdsourced ODR. At its core, however, Aragon
is a blockchain application that allows users to enforce smart contracts and develop
DAOs, mentioned above, which are autonomous organizations that can own property and take action through digitized processes. 150 Aragon aims to create flexible
human-readable agreements that parties can enforce via Ethereum by depositing
collateral in the form of digital assets, namely the Aragon Network Token
(“ANT”). 151 Furthermore, users of the network agree to Aragon’s online arbitration
mechanism for resolving disputes, which uses crowdsourcing similar to Kleros. 152
However, Aragon argues that its process is unique because it “separates juror reputation from collateral and introduces a novel escalation metagame that makes the

141. William George, Why Kleros Needs a Native Token?, MEDIUM (June 7, 2018), https://medium
.com/kleros/why-kleros-needs-a-native-token-5c6c6e39cdfe.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. See also Clement Lesaege & William George, Kleros and Augur—Keeping People Honest on
the Blockchain Through Game Theory, MEDIUM (Feb. 11, 2018), https://medium.com/kleros/kleros-andaugur-keeping-people-honest-on-ethereum-through-game-theory-56210457649c (explaining why the
Kleros system is more just than over crowdsourced dispute resolution in the founders’ estimation).
145. E-mail from William George, Cryptoeconomist with Kleros, to Amy J. Schmitz, Professor at University of Missouri (Oct. 9, 2018) (on file with author).
146. Observations from Doge Pilot 1 (Oct. 15, 2018), dogeobservations.pdf (on file with author).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id. The Kleros system thus assumes that the appeal process is an additional check on the system,
as it is too costly to overcome the honest voters.
150. Bennett Garner, What is Aragon (ANT)?, COIN CENT. (Nov. 5, 2018), https://coincentral.com/aragon-ant-beginners-guide/.
151. Aragon Network, GITHUB, https://github.com/aragon/whitepaper (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) (noting that ANT “utilizes a stability reserve to optimize for usage in governance of the network and as a
reserve currency for collateralizing agreements.”).
152. Id.
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schelling point for jurors more resistant to bribery attacks while minimizing reliance
on victims paying appeal fees.” 153
More particularly, Aragon allows a user to bring a claim by posting a bond
(typically ANT) with a brief of the complaint. 154 Five anonymous jurors are selected from among the users and also post bonds (again, using ANT cryptocurrency). 155 Jurors who side with the winning party receive a monetary reward, while
those who are not in the majority do not get their bonds back. 156 A party can appeal
by posting an even larger bond as the complaint moves up the process, and finally
may reach the Aragon “supreme court” judges—these judges are those with the
highest success rates on the network. 157
Aragon’s ultimate goal is to become fully autonomous through connected smart
contracts and decentralized dispute resolution. 158 Proponents of Aragon argue that
this voting and decentralization will prevent most disputes. Furthermore, the decentralized arbitration process noted above will render government unnecessary in
the operation of DAOs. 159 Despite the many potential benefits of Aragon, however,
even its supporters have questioned whether its arbitration system is truly unbiased
and whether it effectively prevents “gaming” of the system by repeat players. 160 In
addition, it is unclear whether robust mechanisms are in place to fix software bugs
and deter attackers from exploiting those bugs. 161

3. Jur.io
Like Kleros, Jur promises fast and fair online dispute resolution using
crowdsourcing and game theory. Jur operates much like Kleros in that disputing
parties offer resolutions along with a number of tokens to “stake” their proposals. 162
Voters decide which proposal to uphold and a decision is rendered at the end of
twenty-four hours, or longer if parties so choose. 163 Other token holders vote for
one of the options, and the option that receives the majority of the votes wins. Like
Kleros, voters who vote against the majority are penalized by losing tokens. The
theory is that this will encourage fair voting, while discouraging dishonesty. Jur
advertises itself as a free service to users for creating and securing smart contracts,
and resolving contract disputes within 24 hours. 164

153. Id.
154. Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 68, at 49-50.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 50.
157. Id. Garner, supra note 152. “Courts are organized into a hierarchical structure, with more specific
and specialized contexts at the bottom and more broad and general contexts at the top. As agents participate as jurors in a court they earn reputation in the court as well as any courts directly above in the
hierarchical structure. At the very top of this structure is a supreme court that enforces and encodes the
community values of the Aragon Network.” GITHUB, supra note 153.
158. Luis Cuende & Jorge Izquierdo, Aragon Network: A Decentralized Infrastructure for Value Exchange, ARAGON WIKI (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.chainwhy.com/upload/default/20180705/49f3850f
2702ec6be0f57780b22feab2.pdf.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Introductory Video, JUR.IO, https://jur.io/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
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Accordingly, Jur’s key promise seems to be speed and security in smart contracting. 165 Jur’s dispute resolution system can be open or closed, allowing random
token-holders to vote or only particular voters who are vetted. 166 Jur claims to be
unique in offering users the opportunity to create their own hub (a “specialized oracle”) which operates on special rules that users in particular industries will create
to fit their contexts. 167 Additionally, the Jur platform provides tools for signing
contracts, and creating and reselling contract templates. 168
Nonetheless, Jur acknowledges that two parties can use its platform to create
an illegal contract or contract that is substantially unfair to one party. 169 It uses the
same economic incentive system that guides its oracles in order to reject unethical
disputes. 170 Like other voters, those who prevail in the “reject” decision earn tokens
for being on the winning side. 171

C. “Bot” Resolutions
As noted above, AI is growing in acceptance. In fact, it is even entering the
courtroom and disrupting the law. 172 AI is helping judges set bail, and lawyers do
legal research. 173 Ideally, algorithms may assist fair and efficient dispute resolution
for smart contracts by providing predictive analysis and quickly suggesting resolutions that may be subsequently entered into the blockchain. Furthermore, these algorithms will likely become “smarter” with the infusion of more data.
Nonetheless, use of AI can be problematic, and can even potentially worsen the
risk of bias in determinations. 174 First, there is evidence that people tend to defer
to statistical data instead of using the data to help form an independent judgment. 175
Accordingly, use of AI to provide “bot” predictions to judges or arbitrators could
essentially mean bots actually decide cases, when the determining parties “rubber
stamp” these predictions. This is made worse when AI algorithms rely on data that
reflects human prejudice. 176 This is the “garbage in, garbage out” problem that
occurs when AI “learns” from biased information. Some also worry that use of AI
for “bot” resolutions may take on a life of its own, rendering it harder to identify
the factors leading to a particular outcome as machine learning progresses. 177
165. JUR, White Paper, JUR.IO, https://jur.io/content/uploads/2018/07/JUR-WhitePaper-v0.3-eng.pdf
(last updated July 2, 2018).
166. Id. at 15.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 17.
169. Id. at 46.
170. Id.
171. JUR, supra note 167, at 46.
172. Matt O’Brien & Dake Kang, AI in the Court: When Algorithms Rule on Jail Time, PHYS.ORG (Jan.
31, 2018), https://phys.org/news/2018-01-ai-court-algorithms.html.
173. Artificial Intelligence and Lights-Out Court Document Processing, COMPUTING SYS. INNOVA
TIONS (Nov. 6, 2017), http://csisoft.com/artificial-intelligence-and-lights-out-court-document-processing; see Hal Marcus, Court Supports eDiscovery Machine Learning, Addresses AI Transparency,
OPENTEXT (Dec. 12, 2017), https://blogs.opentext.com/court-supports-ediscovery-machine-learning-addresses-ai-transparency/.
174. Stephen Buranyi, Rise of the Racist Robots—How AI is Learning All Our Worst Impulses, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/aug/08/rise-of-the-racist-robots-how-ai-is-learning-all-our-worst-impulses.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Of course, the day may come when predictive analytics and AI are capable of
rendering quick and fair resolutions in all smart contract cases. Furthermore, AI
may have a place in providing predictions of how best to resolve disputes, which
the parties may consider in crafting their own resolutions. Nonetheless, AI is currently not sufficiently advanced to provide “bot” resolutions with no human input
for most smart contract disputes.

V. ENVISIONING A ROBUST ODR SYSTEM FOR SMART CONTRACTS
It has become common in many traditional contracts to include “dispute resolution clauses” or “arbitration clauses” that specify the redress process that will be
utilized should a disagreement arise regarding the contract. More than half of the
employment agreements drafted in the U.S. contain such clauses 178 and hundreds
of millions of consumer contracts contain such clauses as well. 179 If you go to an
office supply store and buy a book of useful business contract templates, odds are
they will have embedded arbitration clauses (usually specifying the American Arbitration Association). There is a reason for this: specifying dispute resolution procedures in contracts can streamline resolutions and minimize the risk of resourceconsuming litigation. Any General Counsel worth his or her salt knows this, and
will guide executives to be proactive in inserting such clauses.
The wisdom of this advice is equally relevant in smart contracts. When agreements are made between individuals or organizations, problems will inevitably
arise, no matter how much careful planning is present at the creation of the agreement. But because smart contracts operate so differently than traditional contracts,
we need to envision resolution systems that are similarly different in their operation.
As we have described, ODR is a good fit with smart contracts because it works
the way the internet works. Redress processes can be built directly into the agreements themselves, independent of legal jurisdiction. If technology is used to craft
the smart contract (maybe within a marketplace or a legal services website) then a
clause can be inserted at creation specifying the use of an ODR system within that
software platform should any dispute eventually arise. For example, if a party uses
RocketLawyer to draft a reseller agreement as a smart contract, the contract can
specify the use of the RocketLawyer Resolution Center for dealing with any disputes in the performance of the contract.
In smart contracts, the ODR clause can operate in the same manner as the Andon System in the field of quality control. The Andon System is an element of the
Jidoka quality-control method pioneered in Japan by Toyota. 180 It says that any
worker on a production line has the authority to push a button to stop the line if they

178. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 6,
2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courtsis-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-workers/.
179. CFPB Issues Rule to Ban Companies from Using Arbitration Clauses to Deny Groups of People
Their Day in Court, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 10, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov
/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-ban-companies-using-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-peopletheir-day-court/.
180. “Andon”—The Definition, SAGECLARITY, https://sageclarity.com/solutions/andon-system/ (last
visited Jan. 17, 2018).
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identify a problem. 181 In the smart contract context, an ODR clause coded into the
smart contract can enable both parties to push a similar (perhaps virtual) button to
stop the execution of the smart contract, triggering the ODR process. The ODR
process could then follow in accordance with the parties’ previous agreement (perhaps mediation, arbitration, or crowdsourced resolutions). Depending on the outcome achieved, the smart contract may then resume operation along the previous
lines, or perhaps it will be left inactive and replaced by a new agreement that will
also be coded into a smart contract and put on the blockchain.
In this way, the ODR clause in the smart contract can operate like an escrow
arrangement. Instead of only two parties to the agreement, the inclusion of the ODR
clause creates a role for a third party, the dispute resolution service provider. If
either of the first two parties presses the Andon button, the role of the third party is
automatically invoked. In an escrow arrangement, a trusted third party holds payment until the payor indicates that it is satisfied, at which point the payment is released to the payee. In a smart contract ODR clause, either party can invoke the
ODR process at any time. This freezes the execution of the smart contract and gives
the neutral third party the power to determine the appropriate path forward from
that point.
Nonetheless, this process should not allow a party to use the type of delay and
hindrance tactics that currently plague litigation. In other words, parties should not
thwart efficiency of smart contracts with continual and/or frivolous “freezes.” Strict
time limits must be embedded in the ODR process, and penalties applied against
those who misuse the ability to freeze smart contract execution. There could also
be limits on when parties are able to use a freeze. For example, the smart contract
code could include examples of when a freeze is proper—such as where there is an
indication that something is awry with the performance or code in the blockchain.
At the same time, another way to ensure enforcement is to require the parties
to maintain a deposit balance in escrow for the term of the contract. For example,
payors could put the required funds into a neutrally administered account to ensure
that a) they would be able to reclaim the funds should they not be satisfied with the
performance of the payee, and b) payees would be assured that the funds were available and the payors would not default on their debts. The escrowed funds could
also be released in stages upon the achievement of pre-determined milestones. This
also obviates the need for any collection enforcement, which consumes great
amounts of time and resources in traditional contracts. 182
The ideas and providers noted above for resolving smart contracts demonstrate
the range of possibilities and opportunities for creativity. Any of the methods described could work as the redress process for smart contract disputes. Some parties
may opt for human-driven resolution systems, such as assisted negotiation or fast
arbitrations by experts in the field. For example, there would be panels of neutrals
for the various types of smart contract disputes that are likely to arise, such as a
panel of neutrals who understand computer coding, who could offer solutions to
coding disputes. Additionally, other ODR panels would include shipping experts
181. Gwynn Guilford, GM’s Decline Truly Began with its Quest to Turn People into Machines,
QUARTZ (Dec. 30, 2018), https://qz.com/1510405/gms-layoffs-can-be-traced-to-its-quest-to-turn-people-into-machines/. The Andon cord is “a sort of emergency brake that would, once pulled, immediately
stop the assembly line.” Id.
182. We understand that these are novel ideas, and do not yet exist. However, part of blockchain’s
allure is that it allows for reinvention to further innovations.
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who can address supply chain issues. There may also be a need for legal experts
who can quickly respond to contract defenses, such as unconscionability, that are
certain to arise. Other parties may opt for crowdsourced systems, as described
above, or machine–learning/AI powered systems that can deliver quicker decisions
in lower value, less complex cases.
In fact, having a range of options ensures that each individual smart contract
can be best matched with an ODR process that the parties feel is appropriate. As
we say in the face-to-face dispute resolution field, it is important to “fit the forum
to the fuss.” 183 Having variety in ODR processes and procedures will ensure every
type of smart contract can be matched with an appropriate redress design. In fact,
as smart contracts and blockchain evolve, innovation will continue within the ODR
provider community, ensuring that ODR options remain innovative, modern, relevant, and easy to use.
One body that has thought through these designs in a detailed fashion is EOS.
EOS.IO is a blockchain protocol powered by the native cryptocurrency, EOS.
EOS.IO operates as a smart contract platform and decentralized operating system
intended for high volume commercial transactions. The system is designed to eliminate transaction fees and conduct millions of transactions per second. 184 The initial
EOS whitepaper envisioned that fast and fair resolutions would be essential to promote trust and stability within the EOS framework. This created a dispute resolution body tasked with resolving dispute claims upon network launch.
EOS’ Standards for Dispute Resolution are intended to serve as fundamental
ethical guidelines for dispute resolution providers and to transparently lay out the
resolution process for any disputes that arise. The Standards are enforced by the
EOS governing bodies, and if any ODR provider is determined to violate the standards, they may be subject to suspension, fines, or ejection from the provider marketplace. The Standards require ODR providers to be impartial, free from conflicts
of interest, competent, fair, transparent, and committed to preserving the confidentiality of the parties. These Standards preserve enough flexibility for ODR providers to offer a variety of innovative approaches to redress, while ensuring a level of
baseline quality and trust that will attract and retain users of the EOS platform. It
is likely that their foresight in creating these Standards will lead other blockchain
and smart contract systems to follow suit.

VI. CONCLUSION
Smart contracts and blockchain are growing fast, but for now they represent
only a tiny portion of the massive $450 billion global legal marketplace. It remains
to be seen how long it will take them to (or in fact, if they will ever) reach the tipping
point of widespread adoption. Advocates of innovation often have projections
around adoption rates that are clouded by self-interest. If the growth of ODR in ecommerce is any indication, it may take ten to fifteen years before smart contracts
are commonly utilized in everyday legal agreements.
But one development that will be essential to widespread adoption is fast and
fair redress. Early adopters may be willing to risk some growing pains in making
183. FRANK E. A. SANDER, FITTING THE FORUM TO THE FUSS: A USER-FRIENDLY GUIDE TO
ING AN ADR PROCEDURE (1994).
184. EOS.IO, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EOS.IO (last visited Jan. 9, 2019).
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the decision to use smart contracts for their agreements. However, the vast majority
of contract signatories will wait until smart contracts are stable, proven, tested, and
trustworthy. Building effective ODR into smart contracts will be a crucial step in
achieving that level of certainty.
Of course, there will be horror stories that emerge along the way. Just as cryptocurrencies had to endure fiascos like Silk Road, 185 Mt. Gox, 186 and the 2018
“coinpocalypse” 187 on their way to acceptance, smart contracts will raise their own
stories of gloom and doom. There will be abusive smart contracts, and kangaroocourt processes for resolving disputes. However, the efficiency and safety of smart
contracts will become increasingly sophisticated, and intelligent ODR providers
will emerge to resolve related disputes. Ethical standards for ODR promoted by
organizations like the EOS Standards for Dispute Resolution and the International
Council for Online Dispute Resolution will go a long way toward building parties’
confidence in ODR. 188 Additionally, innovation and competition among startups
designing and providing ODR systems will promote best practices. Accordingly,
unscrupulous actors will remain exceptions that fuel learning opportunities on the
path to more trustworthy and ethical smart contract redress systems.

185. Steven Buchko, A Brief History of the Silk Road: Drugs, (Non)Violence, and Video Games, COIN
CENT. (July 29, 2018), https://coincentral.com/silk-road-history/.
186. Darryn Pollock, The Mess that was Mt. Gox: Four Years On, COIN TELEGRAPH (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/the-mess-that-was-mt-gox-four-years-on.
187. Billy Bambrough, Update: Bitcoin Falls Further, Hitting Ripple (XRP) and Ethereum—And Tron
Turns Red, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2019/01/10/bitcoinfalls-suddenly-dragging-ripple-xrp-and-ethereum-down-but-tron-leaps-higher/#53dbaf0f27df. See also
And So the CoinPocalypse Begins, REDDIT (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/9z9esj/and_so_the_coinpocalypse_begins/; The Coinpocalypse, INVESTING IN
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